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Dolzani: Work for Hire Doctrine

DETERMINING THE EXTENT OF THE WORK FOR HIRE
DOCTRINE AND ITS EFFECT ON TERMINATION RIGHTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND CIRCUIT
Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby1
(decided August 8, 2013)

I.

INTRODUCTION

Today, motion picture adaptations of childhood comic book
heroes are major block-buster films that generate billions of dollars
worldwide.2 As the popularity and value in creating these derivative
works intensifies, the artists who originally drew and depicted these
iconic characters are beginning to demand their share of the wealth.3
Termination rights are available for an artist to take back ownership
of the copyright he originally assigned, regardless of whether the
work was created under the Copyright Act of 1976 or the Copyright
Act of 1909.4 Termination rights are especially important in relation
to derivative works because if an artist is able to terminate copyrights, he will be entitled to the profits if works are converted into a
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 2012 in Philosophy, Western New England University. Special thanks to Professor Rena Seplowitz for
guidance on my Note and throughout my law school career, to the Touro Law Review staff,
especially to Tara M. Breslawski, who provided structure and valuable critiques to ensure
the best work possible, and to my parents for always instilling confidence and pushing me to
succeed.
1
726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, No. 13-1178, 2014 WL 1275190
(U.S. March 21, 2014) (No. 13-1178).
2
See BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com (last visited May 2, 2014). Iron
Man 3, the latest Marvel movie based on a character Kirby helped create, has grossed more
than $1.2 billion worldwide. Iron Man 3, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.co
m/movies/?id=ironman3.htm (last visited May 2, 2014).
3
Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 310 (2d Cir.
2013).
4
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2006).
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box office success. However, if the work is considered a work made
for hire, the artist is no longer entitled to ownership of the work.5
The work for hire doctrine, which is applicable to works created under the 1976 Act and the 1909 Act, governs whether the employer of an artist is the actual owner of the copyright and the one entitled to all present and future rights. The work for hire doctrine
grants ownership rights in the copyright to the employer as the entity
which controlled the work and took a risk creating it.6 In a conflict
between an artist and the hiring party over ownership, various factors
are considered in order to determine which party has an actual interest in a work. If a copyright holder did not originate a work or receive the assignment rights, it is improper for him to be the legal
owner. Determining whether a work is a work made for hire is a difficult task for the courts, and in Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, the
court, once again, faced the issue of whether an artist’s work constituted a work made for hire.7
The background of this case begins with the career of the
famed comic book artist Jack Kirby.8 Kirby “began his career in the
comic book business in the late 1930s.”9 Marvel Comics, founded in
1939, contracted with Kirby in 1940 to purchase all ten issues of
Captain America from Kirby and his business partner, Joe Simon.10
Throughout the years, Kirby was considered a freelancer for Marvel
because he was “not a formal employee of Marvel, and not paid a
fixed wage or salary. He did not receive benefits, and was not reimbursed for expenses or overhead in creating his drawings.”11 When
Marvel would purchase Kirby’s work, it compensated him based on a
per-page rate.12
The litigation was based on the property rights of 262 works
which Kirby created and Marvel published by Marvel between 1958
and 1963.13 The district court was asked to determine whether Mar-

5

Id.
See infra section IV (discussing the application of instance and expense test under the
work for hire doctrine).
7
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 124.
8
Id. at 125.
9
Id. at 124-25.
10
Id. at 125.
11
Id. at 125-26.
12
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 126.
13
Id. at 125.
6
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vel or Kirby’s heirs owned the works created during that time.14
Throughout the relevant period, Marvel’s director, Stan Lee, stated
that he and Jack Kirby were “closely affiliated” and that he gave Jack
Kirby a “steady stream of work.”15 Although Jack Kirby was considered a freelancer, the facts of Marvel indicate that Jack Kirby did
most of his work with “Marvel projects in mind.”16
A.

Procedural History

In September 2009, the children of Jack Kirby sent termination notices to various Marvel entities, purporting to end Marvel’s assignment of Jack Kirby’s copyrighted works.17 In response, Marvel
filed suit for declaratory judgment in January 2010, arguing that the
defendants had no termination rights under Section 304(c) of the
Copyright Act of 1976 because the works of Jack Kirby were works
made for hire.18 In March 2010, the Kirbys filed a motion to dismiss
in the federal district court in New York.19 The Kirbys claimed that
Lisa and Neal Kirby, residents of California, were not subject to personal jurisdiction in the federal court in New York.20 Based on Lisa
and Neal’s personal jurisdiction argument, the Kirbys then argued
that Lisa and Neal were indispensable parties under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 19,21 and therefore, the suit should be dismissed
because it could not proceed without them.22 The district court denied the Kirbys’ motion and stated that it did have “personal jurisdiction over Lisa and Neal under New York’s Long Arm Statute.”23
Therefore, the district court did not need to reach the issue of whether

14
Id. at 124. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, the heirs of the person who holds the copyright can exercise termination rights. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1), (2).
15
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 126 (noting how Jack Kirby had a freer hand than the other artists
and Kirby did not have page by page instructions as did other Marvel artists).
16
Id. (noting the majority of Kirby’s works were published by Marvel and the works were
mainly intended to fit within specific Marvel themes).
17
Id. at 127.
18
Id. See infra notes 59, 61 (explaining why the heirs of Jack Kirby have standing to exercise termination rights, and also why the current Act is relevant for the issue of termination
rights).
19
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 127.
20
Id. at 124, 127 (noting Lisa and Neal Kirby are two of the four heirs of Jack Kirby arguing for termination rights).
21
FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
22
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 127.
23
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 [2014], Art. 3

896

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Lisa and Neal were indispensable parties.24 After discovery was
completed, both parties moved for summary judgment.25 The court
granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and stated that Jack
Kirby’s works were works made for hire and the Kirbys had no valid
termination rights.26 The Kirbys appealed the district court’s determination.27
The opinion in Marvel analyzed both the procedural disputes
and the main issue concerning the parties’ rights under the Copyright
Act of 1976.28 The central issue for the court was whether Jack Kirby’s works were “works made for hire” in order for Marvel to claim
ownership rights to the works.29 Although the opinion in Marvel resolved which procedural rules applied to the parties, this note focuses
on the development of the work for hire doctrine in the Second Circuit and the application of the instance and expense test under the
doctrine. Finally, this note critically analyzes the scope of the doctrine and its implications for those seeking to exercise termination
rights. While the court in Marvel was correct in determining Marvel
had a right to control elements of Kirby’s works, it dismissed other
factual issues which may have shown that they were not works for
hire, and thus Kirby owned them.
II.

THE OPINION—THE PROCEDURAL ROAD TO THE CENTRAL
ISSUE
A.

Personal Jurisdiction: Were the Kirbys Pulled in
by the Long Arm of New York?

A brief analysis of the procedural issues in Marvel provides a
necessary context for the court’s main issue. Personal jurisdiction is

24

Id.
Id.
26
Id. at 127-28.
27
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 128.
28
Id. at 128, 131-32, 136.
29
Id. at 124. The Second Circuit applied the instance and expense test to determine
whether Kirby’s works were works made for hire. Id. at 140-41. The Supreme Court, in
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742-43 (1989), rejected the Second
Circuit’s instance and expense test as an appropriate test to determine when a work arising
under the 1976 Act is a work for hire. However, the Second Circuit still applies the instance
and expense test to determine whether a work arising under the 1909 Act is a work made for
hire. See infra section IV.
25
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proper if a litigant is proven to be “present” in the forum state.30
Presence in the forum state need not be physical presence, but rather
based on the existence of certain minimum contacts of the litigant
with the forum state.31 New York enacted its own long-arm personal
jurisdiction statute which states:
[a]s to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an
agent: . . . transacts any business within the state or
contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the
state.32
On appeal, the court in Marvel held that New York did not
have personal jurisdiction over Lisa and Neal Kirby.33 Lisa and Neal,
who were residents of California, were not present in New York because their communications with Marvel, i.e., the sending of the termination notices, did not constitute adequate business transactions
within New York.34 The court stated that the Kirbys did not “purposefully avail [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
[the] law.”35 Thus, the exercise of their purported rights under the
federal copyright law did not constitute purposeful availment.
To support the court’s narrow view of personal jurisdiction in
Marvel, the court looked to Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. Menzies,36
which held that the defendant’s cease and desist letter sent to the
plaintiff did not constitute adequate business transactions.37 In Menzies, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment in New York district
court, arguing its weight loss products did not infringe on the defendant’s copyrights.38 Analyzing the weight of the letters in connection
with personal jurisdiction, the court held that the defendant’s letter
alleging infringement in an unspecified place and in an unspecified
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
Id. at 316.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 2014).
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 129-31.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 128 (citing Beacon Enters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1983)).
715 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 759-60.
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forum was not an “activity invoking the ‘benefits and protections’ of
New York law.”39 The court refused to apply a broad interpretation
of what constituted “transacting business” and stated, “New York
courts have consistently refused to sustain section 302(a)(1) jurisdiction solely on the basis of defendant’s communication from another
locale with a party in New York.”40 Although the cease and desist
letters were sent to Beacon’s New York offices, the letters alone were
not enough to trigger New York’s long-arm statute.41
Relying on earlier case law, the court in Marvel determined
that the long-arm statute may not apply in situations when the isolated transaction does not afford the party at issue the protections and
benefits of New York law.42 Lisa and Neal Kirby were not present in
New York; thus, they could not be present in the case before the
court.
B.

Joinder and Indispensable Parties: Another
Procedural Tactic Used by the Kirbys

Because the court held that Lisa and Neal Kirby were not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, the court proceeded to determine whether Lisa and Neal were indispensable parties, an issue
the district court did not reach.43 According to Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible. (1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court
of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party
if: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or (B)
that person claims an interest relating to the subject of
39

Id. at 760, 766 (noting the cease and desist letter did not state where the alleged infringement occurred, and it did not state where the plaintiff would take legal action).
40
Id. at 766.
41
Beacon Enters., 715 F.2d at 766; see also Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830,
837 (N.Y. 2007) (holding personal jurisdiction not satisfied when the defendant’s only business transactions were sending letters in according with English procedural rules). But see
Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs., 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1143 (N.Y. 2006)
(holding personal jurisdiction proper because the parties’ internet communications constituted continuous business transactions for substantial amounts of money).
42
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 128-30.
43
Id. at 132.
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the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical
matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect
the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.44
The court articulated each factor under the rule in order to determine whether Lisa and Neal Kirby would be prejudiced if the litigation proceeded in their absence.45 The court first determined Lisa
and Neal Kirby were required parties to the claim under Rule 19(a)
because they had a great interest in the outcome of the suit.46 However, Lisa and Neal were not indispensable under Rule 19(b) because
they would not be prejudiced if a judgment was rendered in their absence.47 The court stated that Lisa and Neal Kirby had the same interests as the remaining Kirbys in the case, so they did not need “their
day in court” because the other appellants would litigate on their behalf.48 Because of the Kirbys’ identical interests, any judgment rendered against the remaining Kirbys would foreclose Lisa and Neal’s
rights as well.49
To determine when a party is considered indispensable, the
court looked to Prescription Plan Service Corp. v. Franco,50 in which
a New York corporation sued several trustees of the company for diverting funds from a benefit program.51 In this case, the lower court
dismissed two defendants from the claim for being non-diverse and
stated that those two defendants were indispensable parties.52 However, on appeal, the court held that the two defendants were not indispensable parties because their interests were identical to the interests of the remaining defendants.53 The court reasoned that neither
the absent nor the remaining defendants would be prejudiced because
44

FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 133-35.
46
Id. at 132.
47
Id. at 133.
48
Id. at 134 (stating a judgment rendered against the remaining Kirbys would foreclose
Lisa and Neal’s rights because all the Kirbys’ interests in the case were identical).
49
Id.
50
552 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1977).
51
Id. at 494-95.
52
Id. at 496.
53
Id. at 497.
45
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any judgment in favor of the plaintiffs would be paid by the corporation that the defendants represented, so none of the defendants would
be personally liable.54 Also, the court stated the interests of the parties were still represented by the same counsel, with the same vigor.55
Although the absent defendants had a viable stake in the outcome, the
remaining defendants suffered no prejudice because their interests
were sufficiently represented by the presence of the remaining defendants. Therefore, even though Lisa and Neal Kirby were not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, the case was able to proceed because Lisa and Neal were not indispensable parties, and their
interests would be represented by the remaining parties to the suit.56
III.

THE OPINION—THE ORIGINS OF THE WORK FOR HIRE
DOCTRINE
A.

Why Termination Rights Rest on the Work for
Hire Doctrine

After the court resolved the procedural issues, it turned to the
parties’ copyright arguments. Determining whether a work is made
for hire is critical for the artist, especially if he believes his work is
copyrightable. If it is determined that the work was made for hire,
the employer is the owner of the work. Therefore, the artist is not entitled to the profits generated from the work and cannot assign the
copyright to others. However, if the artist’s work is copyrightable
and it is not a work for hire, the artist owns the copyright, which he
can assign to others, and he also has the right to terminate any assignment after the statutory period.57 Importantly, termination rights
provide artists with another chance at marketing their work at a later
time.58 For example, artists may expand their work by incorporating
it into lucrative derivative works, which may not have been available
when they first obtained the copyright. Therefore, the issue of
whether the Kirbys had present termination rights under the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) rested on whether Jack Kirby’s works

54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Prescription Plan, 552 F.2d at 497.
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 134.
17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1)(A).
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.01[A] (2013).
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were, in fact, works made for hire.59 Section 304(c) of the Act provides the prerequisites needed in order to have termination rights:
Termination of Transfers and Licenses Covering Extended Renewal Term.—In the case of any copyright
subsisting in either its first or renewal term on January
1, 1978, other than a copyright in a work made for
hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer
or license of the renewal copyright or any right under
it, executed before January 1, 1978 . . . is subject to
termination.60
Because the termination rights associated with a copyrighted
work belonging to an employer cannot be exercised by the original
artist when a work is considered one made for hire, Marvel argued
that Kirby’s works were made for hire during the relevant time period
based on evidence of his close working relationship with Marvel.61
Therefore, if Marvel prevailed under this argument, the Kirbys would
not have termination rights under the Act.
In order for the court to reconcile whether Jack Kirby’s works
were works made for hire, the court had to first interpret the term, as
used in case law under the Copyright Act of 1909, which was— “the
law in effect when the works were created.”62 A work for hire
agreement can be impliedly found by looking at the relationship between the hired party and the artist.63 The 1909 Act did not provide a
definition of a work made for hire, but it did state, “the word ‘author’

59

Marvel, 726 F.3d at 124.
17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (emphasis added). If an author is no longer alive, § 304(c)(2) grants
his or her termination rights to specified heirs. See § 304(c)(3) for when a copyright owner
is allowed to send notice of termination.
61
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 127.
62
Id. at 137. Marvel argued that the works were works made for hire under 304(c) of the
1976 Act because the issue of termination rights falls under the current Act. Id. at 136. The
actual meaning of a work made for hire developed first under the 1909 Act. Id. at 137.
While the work for hire doctrine has expanded under the current Act, “[it] did not cause any
immediate break in the courts’ reasoning; thus, it is necessary to consult cases decided under
the current Act to round out one’s understanding of the work for hire doctrine under the 1909
Act as well.” 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, at § 5.03[B][1][a][i].
63
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 139. See also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 634-35 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing the test used for finding an implied work for hire agreement). “In determining whether a
work is a work for hire under the 1909 Act, we have generally applied the ‘instance and expense’ test. The copyright belongs to the person at whose ‘instance and expense’ the work
was created.” Id.
60
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shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.”64 This
meant that if the work was made for hire, the author of the work was
the employer, rather than the artist.65 However, terms such as “works
made for hire” and “employer” were not specifically defined under
the Act.66 Therefore, it was up to the courts to develop these terms
and shape the meaning of the work for hire doctrine.67
B.

Early Development of the Doctrine

Because the work for hire doctrine focused on whether the
owner of a copyright was the artist or the artist’s employer, the courts
analyzed common law employment relationships.68 Looking to the
Second Circuit’s development of the work for hire doctrine, the
courts focused on “whether the work at issue was created within the
scope of a traditional employment relationship”69 in order to determine which party was the statutory “author.”70
Under the law of agency, the employer would be the owner of
his employee’s work in a traditional employer-employee relationship.71 However, the courts realized that although the parties were
not engaged in a traditional employer-employee relationship, the
hired party could be controlled to such an extent by the hiring party
that he is considered an employee.72 The courts then needed to determine when the hired party was acting as an employee within the
scope of employment for work for hire purposes.73 Initially, the Second Circuit resolved this issue by stating, “[i]f a [party] ‘is solicited
by a patron to execute a commission for pay, the presumption should
be indulged that the patron desires to control the publication . . . unless by the terms of the contract, express or implicit, the artist has reserved the copyright [in] himself.’ ”74 The right to control the pro-

64

Marvel, 726 F.3d at 137.
Id.
66
1 NIMMER, supra note 58, at § 5.03[B][1][a][i].
67
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 137.
68
Id. at 137-38.
69
Id. at 137.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 137-38.
72
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 139.
73
Id. at 137.
74
Id. at 138 (quoting Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939)
(emphasis added)).
65
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duction of the work was a determining factor as to whether the creator of the work was a mere independent contractor or an employee.
C.

Development Under the 1976 Act—The Reid
Decision

After the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, the Act
provided a definition of what constituted a work made for hire, and it
seemed to incorporate the judicial decisions under the previous Act:
A ‘work made for hire’ is—(1) a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for
use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as
an instructional text . . . if the parties expressly agree
in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire.75
However, similar to the issue with the 1909 Act, it was still left to the
courts to define the terms “scope of employment” and “employer/employee” as they applied to the 1976 Act.
The Supreme Court decision in Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid76 followed the enactment of the present Act and resolved a split in the circuits on the appropriate test to use for work for
hire issues.77 The Court officially adopted the common law of agency to determine whether the hired party was an employee acting within the scope of employment for work for hire purposes.78 In this case,
the plaintiff, a nonprofit organization benefitting the homeless,
brought an action to establish a copyright in a sculpture that the defendant created for the organization.79 The parties initially entered
75

17 U.S.C § 101 (2006).
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
77
See 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, at § 5.03[B][1][a]-[a][iii] (noting the circuit split regarding what standard to apply in work for hire cases).
78
Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-40. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (2006):
An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing
work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the employer's control. An employee's act is not within the scope
of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct
not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.
79
Reid, 490 U.S. at 733, 735.
76
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into a contract for the defendant to build a sculpture to “dramatize the
plight of the homeless” that would be on display at the plaintiff’s
Christmas pageant.80 The plaintiff’s members often visited the defendant to check on the progress of the work, and the defendant
sculptor took most of their suggestions regarding the appearance and
structure of the piece.81 The defendant was paid his final installment
check upon completion of the work.82
The controversy reached the Supreme Court, which held that
the sculpture was not a work made for hire under Section 101(1), and
therefore, the defendant owned the sculpture.83 The Court relied
heavily on the traditional common law principles of agency to determine whether the defendant was acting within the scope of employment when he built the sculpture.84 Under the law of agency, an employee is an agent whose employer controls “the manner and means”
of the employee’s performance or work.85 However, an independent
contractor is someone who contracts with another to do work, but is
not controlled by that person.86 Based on this theory, the Court held
that the defendant was not an employee, but rather an independent
contractor because he set his own hours, supplied his own tools, and
was not paid employee benefits by the plaintiff which also did not
manifest an intent to assign future work to the defendant.87 Because
80

Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
82
Id. at 735.
83
Id. at 736.
84
Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-40. See NIMMER, supra note 58, at § 5.01[B][1][a][iii] (“[T]he
court unanimously ruled that Congress’ use of the terms ‘employee’ and ‘scope of employment’ evinced its intent to invoke traditional agency law principles.”).
85
Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52 (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 7.07(3)(a) (stating that “an employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right
to control the manner and means of the agent's performance of work.”). See generally Parker v. Domino’s Pizza, 629 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
86
Parker, 629 So. 2d at 1027.
87
Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-53. In determining the scope of employment, the Court in Reid
also determined other relevant factors such as:
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and
paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 751-52.
81
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the plaintiff had no right to control the defendant’s work, it was not a
work made for hire.
The decision in Reid was crucial to the development of the
work for hire doctrine. The Court heavily applied agency law precedent to scrutinize the parties’ relationships and determine whether a
work was made for hire.88 In addition, this decision redefined “the
““right to control.”89 Early cases examined whether the employer
had the right to control production, but the Court in Reid rejected that
approach because it was “inconsistent with the language, structure,
and legislative history of the work for hire provisions.”90 The Court
specified that under the principles of agency law, the analysis must be
whether the hiring party had the “right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished.”91 “The “manner and
means” approach expanded the work for hire doctrine by including
elements of agency.92 Although the Court in Reid established a new
standard for works arising under the 1976 Act, the court in Marvel
continued with its own standard when it applied the instance and expense test to works arising under the 1909 Act.93
The Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of 1976, as
well as case law under both Acts, looked to traditional employment
relationships to determine whether a person’s works fell under the
works for hire doctrine. As the approach to determining ownership
of works became clearer, tests such as the instance and expense test
would further clarify the work for hire doctrine under the 1909 Act.
IV.

INSTANCE AND EXPENSE TEST & ITS APPLICATION IN
MARVEL
A.

Origins of Instance and Expense Test

After the Supreme Court’s discussion in Reid, the law of
agency was the new standard, and courts examined “the hiring party’s right to control the “manner and means” of the artist’s work to
88
Id. at 736. Section 101(2) was not applicable in Reid because the sculpture was not
considered a contribution to a collective work and there was no written agreement between
the two parties. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2).
89
Reid, 490 U.S. at 736-37, 751.
90
Id. at 750-51.
91
Id. at 751 (emphasis added)
92
Id.
93
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 140-41.
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determine the scope of employment.94 However, the court in Marvel
applied the instance and expense test to determine the owner of Jack
Kirby’s works.95 The test allows the work of an independent contractor to be a work made for hire based on the parties’ agreement or
right to control.96 Although the standard in Reid is applied to works
governed under the current Act, the Second Circuit applies “the ‘instance and expense’ test” to works arising under the 1909 Act.97
The court in Marvel interpreted the terms “instance” and “expense” based on case law which established the test. The court stated
that the term “ ‘instance’ refers to the extent to which the hiring party
provided the impetus for, participated in, or had the power to supervise the creation of the work.”98 The term expense “refers to the resources the hiring party invests in the creation of the work.”99 While
the components of the test portray a general idea of what this approach entails, the courts have more thoroughly defined the test to
show which relationships comprise a work for hire situation.
The Second Circuit first discussed the test in Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp.,100 in which the court determined whether the plaintiff, the publisher of a daily newspaper,
owned the advertisements placed in his newspaper.101 The defendant,
a publisher of a weekly news pamphlet, had the same advertisements
as those in the plaintiff’s paper.102 The plaintiff argued that he owned
the rights to the advertisements.103 The court looked the plaintiff
newspaper’s staff’s control over the works and stated, “[the work for
hire doctrine] is applicable whenever an employee’s work is produced at the instance and expense of his employer.”104 However, the
court did not articulate the factors of the test.105 It was up to later
courts to further develop the test, and its parameters were delineated

94

Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 140-41.
96
Id. at 139.
97
Playboy Enter, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 556 (2d Cir. 1995); Martha Graham, 380
F.3d at 634-35.
98
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 139.
99
Id.
100
369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966).
101
Id. at 567.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. (emphasis added).
105
Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 567-68.
95
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in subsequent cases decided by the Second Circuit.
The decision in Martha Graham School & Dance Foundation, Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc.106
demonstrated how the instance and expense test could be used to find
an implied work for hire agreement concerning works created under
the 1909 Act.107 In this case, the court resolved the issue of whether
numerous choreographed dances created by the famed dance instructor, Martha Graham, were works made for hire.108 Graham also created the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, which was
the defendant in this case.109 Although she founded the school in the
1920s, Graham did not become a full-time employee until 1966.110
The dispute began when the beneficiary under Graham’s will claimed
that he owned the rights to the choreographed work.111 When Graham died, the beneficiary became the defendant school’s artistic director and placed in a trust the copyrighted dances and other intellectual property that passed to him under the will.112 After numerous
disputes between the beneficiary and the school, the beneficiary acted
through the trust and created the plaintiff non-profit organization.113
The plaintiff then became the sole licensee of Graham’s live dance
performances and trademark.114 When the defendant school reopened, the beneficiary sought to enjoin the defendant school from using the dances, but the defendant argued that it owned the works under the work for hire doctrine.115
Because the dances in question were created under the 1909
Act, the court analyzed the circumstances to find evidence of an implied work for hire agreement.116 The court stated that under the
work for hire doctrine, “[a] work is made at the hiring party’s ‘instance and expense’ when the employer induces the creation of the
106

380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 634-35.
108
Id. at 628.
109
Id. at 629-30.
110
Id. at 628, 639.
111
Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 630-31.
112
Id. at 629-30. Originally, the trust assigned many of dances and other property to the
defendant school. Id. at 630. A dispute arose over the beneficiary’s role in the defendant
school and the board of trustees voted him out. Id. Soon after, the school temporarily closed
due to financial difficulties. Id.
113
Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 630.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 630-31.
116
Id. at 634-35, 637, 639.
107
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work and has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which
the work is carried out.”117 The court analyzed each of Graham’s
dances to determine which dances were choreographed within the
scope of her employment with the school.118 The court held that any
dances choreographed before 1956 were not works made for hire because Graham was not employed by the school; thus, the school had
no right to supervise or participate in her work.119 The court also held
that the dances choreographed during the years 1956-1965 were not
works made for hire because Graham was only a “part-time employee” during those years.120 There was “no evidence that the school . . .
commissioned [Graham] to create the dances;” thus, the dances were
not created at the school’s instance.121 Also, Graham’s employment
contract during the relevant time stated that she was only “to teach
and supervise the School’s educational program, and not to choreograph;” therefore, choreographing her own dances was not within the
scope of her employment.122 Looking at the law of agency and Graham’s employment relationship with the school under the instance
and expense test, the court concluded that the specific works created
were her own and were not created on behalf of the school.123 However, the court in Martha Graham then went on to hold that the works
created during the years 1966-1977 were works made for hire and belonged to the school.124 During this period, Graham entered into a
new employment contract in which she went from “part-time dance
instructor to full-time choreographer.”125 Because Graham was acting as a traditional employee when choreographing the dances, the
court held that those dances were works made for hire.126 Furthermore, in terms of the expense component, Graham was a salaried
employee at that time, so she choreographed the dances at the

117

Id. at 635.
Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 637, 639.
119
Id. at 637.
120
Id. at 637-38.
121
Id. at 638.
122
Id.
123
Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 637-38.
124
Id. at 639. The court also held that the dances created by Graham from 1978 through
1991 were works made for hire. Id. at 641. Those dances are governed under the present
Copyright Act of 1976. Id.
125
Id. at 639 (emphasis added) (stressing the importance of Martha Graham’s scope of
employment during the relevant time).
126
Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 139-40.
118
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school’s expense.127 The court explained that the expense requirement was satisfied because the school took a risk by having the dances created on its time and resources, and in return, it compensated
Graham for her work.128 An analysis of Graham’s role as an employee of the school at different time periods evidenced an implied work
for hire agreement. Graham only acted at the school’s instance and
expense when she was a full-time employee acting within the scope
of her employment, and thus, those works were the only ones subject
to the work for hire doctrine.
Examining the hiring party’s creative contributions to the artist’s work and the artist’s payment upon completion of the work may
help determine whether the work was created at the hiring party’s instance and expense. This notion was discussed in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas,129 in which the plaintiff magazine publisher argued
that it owned works of the defendant’s husband as works made for
hire.130 The facts of Playboy, which involved the works of a freelance artist who created his works with the magazine publisher’s
themes in mind, are similar to the facts in Marvel.131 In this case, the
artist created hundreds of works which were published by the plaintiff.132 The defendant was the artist’s wife who inherited the artist’s
works after his death, and the dispute arose after the defendant granted reproduction rights to the artist’s paintings to a third party.133 Because the assigned works were featured in several of the plaintiff’s
publications, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment stating it
owned the works under the work for hire doctrine.134 The district
court held that the works by the artists were created at the plaintiff’s
instance but not expense, so the plaintiff appealed.135
The case reached the Second Circuit, which analyzed the relationship between the plaintiff and the artist in order to determine the

127

Id.
Id.
129
53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995).
130
Id. at 551.
131
Id. at 555. See Marvel, 726 F.3d at 141 (noting the majority of Jack Kirby’s work was
based on Marvel themes).
132
Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 552. The works created by the artist on or after January 1,
1978 were governed by the current Act. Id. at 557.
133
Id. at 553.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 553, 555.
128
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type of working relationship that was established.136 Under the instance component, the plaintiff claimed that it owned the works because it gave the artist specific instructions on how the paintings had
to coincide with the magazine’s articles.137 Over the years, the artist’s paintings were used more frequently, and he was given freer
range to produce paintings without specific instructions from the
plaintiff.138 However, the court agreed with the lower court’s reasoning and found evidence of the plaintiff’s instructions to be controlling.139 Even though the plaintiff’s direct control over the artist’s
works decreased over the years, the prior dealings between the two
parties were enough to prove that the plaintiff had the right to supervise and control the work.140 The instance component was further
satisfied because a majority of the artist’s works were motivated or
induced by the plaintiff.141 Because the artist had the expectation of
the plaintiff’s publishing his works, it proved that the plaintiff induced the creation of the artist’s works.
The court’s focus on the hiring party’s payment to the artist
indicated that the work was made at the plaintiff’s expense.142 The
lower court stated that the expense component was not satisfied because the artist created the works using his own tools and office.143
Furthermore, the plaintiff did not pay employee benefits or taxes on
behalf of the artist.144 Based on these factors, the lower court stated
that the plaintiff assumed no real risk by having the works created.145
However, the Second Circuit resolved the issue when it found that
evidence of the artist’s being paid a “sum certain” for his works was
enough to satisfy the expense component.146 The court stated that the
lower court incorrectly considered the expense factors that the Supreme Court considered in Reid because that standard is inapplicable

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 553.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 556.
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 555 (interpreting the holding in Brattleboro, 369 F.2d

565).
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to works created under the 1909 Act.147 It stated that factors such as
whether the artist supplied his own tools and materials, were irrelevant because those factors were used to determine whether the artist
was an independent contractor or employee, not specifically whether
the work was made at the hiring party’s expense.148 Therefore, the
court broadly held that because the plaintiff took a financial risk, i.e.,
payment for the artist’s work, the expense component was fulfilled.149
The court stated that it was relying on previous Second Circuit case
law for this determination, so it did not find other factors, such as the
use of the artist’s own resources, relevant to the analysis.150
The instance and expense test was used by the Second Circuit
to determine whether the hiring party influenced an independent contractor to such an extent that the independent contractor was actually
considered an employee under the employer’s control. Creating a
work at the direction or encouragement of the hiring party may prove
the artist’s works were made at the party’s instance. Evidence of the
hiring party’s expending resources or even giving payment to the artist may show the hiring party took the risk of having the works created, and thus, the works were created at the party’s expense. The
court in Marvel applied this case law in its own analysis under the instance and expense test.
B.

Application in Marvel

The court in Marvel used the instance and expense test to determine that Jack Kirby was acting under the control of Marvel when he
created the works.151 Under the instance factor, the court analyzed the
continuous working relationship between Kirby and Marvel.152 Even
though Kirby was a “freelancer,” Marvel’s director stated that Kirby was

147

Id. at 555.
Id. (“The factors considered by the district court . . . are among the factors listed by the
Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid which may be used to
show that an artist worked as an independent contractor and not as a formal employee. The
factors have no bearing on whether the work was made at the hiring party's expense.”) (citation omitted).
149
Id.
150
Id. The Second Circuit remanded the case to determine whether the artist’s work after
1977 were works made for hire because “Playboy stopped giving Nagel specific assignments
before January 1, 1978.” Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 556, 556 n.2.
151
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 140-41.
152
Id. at 141.
148
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kept busy with assignments and Kirby’s work was in high demand.153
During the relevant time period, Marvel produced most of Kirby’s
works, and Kirby was influenced by Marvel themes when he created the
work, so it was “hardly self-directed.”154 Marvel also played a creative
role in the creation of Kirby’s works because although he had more
creative control than other Marvel artists, “he worked within the scope
of Marvel’s assignments and titles.”155 Marvel retained the power to reject Kirby’s works or ask for revisions.156 Therefore, evidence produced
by Marvel showed Kirby’s inclination to create works on behalf of Marvel, but Marvel retained the final say in the publication of his works.157
The Kirbys claimed that the works were not made at the instance of Marvel because the “right to supervise” must stem from a
contractual right.158 The Kirbys attempted to narrowly define the
work for hire doctrine when they argued a right to supervise and control the work came from a “contractual right.”159 The Kirbys based
this claim on the analysis in Martha Graham, which discussed the
hiring party’s right to control, even if the right was never exercised.160 The court rejected this claim because the decision in Martha
Graham did not require a specific contractual agreement of the hiring
party’s right to control.161 Therefore, the Kirbys’ argument construed
the “right” too narrowly, and they were not able to support their position.162 If the Kirbys also analyzed the decision in Reid more closely,
they would have noted that the Court settled this issue in its discussion.163 While the Court in Reid adamantly noted the importance of
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of the artist’s
work, the Court made no reference to contractual agreements being
relevant to an analysis of scope of employment.164
153

Id.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 141.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 141-42.
159
Id. (emphasis added).
160
Brief for Appellant at 42-43, Marvel v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 113333) (emphasis added). See also Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 635 (“The right to direct and
supervise the manner in which work is created need never be exercised.”).
161
Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 634-35 (noting the use of the instance and expense test to
determine an implied work for hire agreement under the 1909 Act).
162
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 141-42.
163
Reid, 490 U.S. at 751.
164
Id.
154
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The Kirbys also attempted to survive summary judgment by
pointing to factual disputes regarding which party actually created the
plots, characters, and concepts of the works.165 However, the court
stated it was not necessary to resolve which party put forth its creativity in this case.166 It was obvious that Kirby was hired for his insight
and creativity, but the Kirbys argued that did not evidence a work
made for hire because Kirby used his intelligence and resourcefulness
when he created all his works.167 The Kirbys’ arguments were shown
to be outside the focus of the work for hire analysis and, therefore,
not relevant to the court’s determination.
The court in Marvel was correct in concluding that Jack Kirby’s works were made at the instance of Marvel. Kirby acted under
the direction of Marvel when he sought to create specific works relating to Marvel characters and concepts. Although Kirby’s work was
produced by other publishers, the existence of the steady relationship
between Kirby and Marvel showed Kirby’s dedication and creativity
remained focused on Marvel.
The Kirbys then argued that the works were not created at
Marvel’s expense because Kirby was the one who bore the risk of
loss—he did not receive steady payment for his works and he provided his own supplies and office space.168 The Kirbys also argued that
Jack Kirby took a risk by creating the works because Kirby was uncertain whether Marvel would purchase them.169
Although a more difficult determination for the court, it concluded that Jack Kirby’s works were made at Marvel’s expense.170
Marvel asked the court to analyze the holding in Playboy to conclude
that the evidence of Kirby’s payment was enough to fulfill the expense requirement.171 The court noted that if the relationship between Marvel and Kirby was sporadic or consisted of discreet engagements, it would be prompted to rely on the extraneous factors
presented by the Kirbys.172 However, the court agreed with Marvel
165

Marvel, 726 F.3d at 142.
Id.
167
Id. (“It makes little sense to foreclose a finding that work is made for hire because the
hired artist indeed put his exceptional gifts to work for the party that contracted for their
benefit.”).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 143.
171
Id. at 142; Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 555.
172
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 142.
166
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and rejected the Kirbys’ argument because the evidence showed that
the relationship between Marvel and Kirby was continuous and mutually beneficial.173 Kirby was expected to produce works within
specific Marvel themes, and in return, Marvel would buy Kirby’s
work.174 Even though Kirby’s payment was technically on a contingent basis, Marvel was rarely prompted to refuse Kirby’s work.175
Therefore, Kirby had a grounded expectation that his work would be
bought by Marvel, and this suggested the existence of a formal employment relationship.176
In its analysis of the expense component, the court concluded
that Kirby’s works were not easily marketable to other publishers because the majority of Kirby’s works were for Marvel projects.177 The
works were built on preexisting themes Marvel had created, and thus,
it is determined that Marvel supplied Kirby with some of the resources to do the work.178 Finally, although the court in Marvel considered more factors in the expense analysis than the court in Playboy
did, the court in Marvel relied on Playboy when it stated that “Marvel’s payment of a flat rate and its contribution of both creative and
production value . . . [were] enough to satisfy the expense requirement.”179 Because Marvel paid Kirby a sum certain for his work and
developed the resources Kirby cultivated, the work was made at
Marvel’s expense.
Although there was persuasive evidence that Jack Kirby’s
works were made at Marvel’s instance, the fulfilment of the expense
component is a weaker argument. The court should have relied more
upon the Kirbys’ argument, which presented issues of fact. The arguments in the appellant’s brief contained many factual issues that
the court in Marvel prematurely dismissed.180 For example, it is
plausible to conclude that disputes over the parties’ intent, at the time
the works were created, as to who owned the works should have sur-

173

Id.
Id. at 142-43.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 143.
178
Id.
179
Id. (emphasis added) (stressing the evaluation of the hired party’s payment to the artist,
along with other factors of the parties’ relationship); see also Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at
555.
180
See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 47, 51.
174

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/3

22

Dolzani: Work for Hire Doctrine

2014]

WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE

915

vived summary judgment.181 The Kirbys stated that Jack Kirby’s
checks from Marvel during the relevant time period contained a “legend” acknowledging Kirby’s assignment of his copyrights to Marvel.182 If Marvel stated that Kirby had assignment rights, it meant
Kirby owned the work to be assigned, not Marvel.183
The court then wrongfully determined that Kirby’s work was
not marketable to other publishers even though the Kirbys offered evidence to the contrary.184 During the relevant time period, Jack Kirby
developed a plot line for Thor based on Marvel themes, but Marvel
rejected it.185 Even though the work may have been created at Marvel’s instance, it was not created at Marvel’s expense because Jack
Kirby ended up selling Thor to Marvel’s rival, DC Comics, and Marvel did not object.186 Although the court mentioned that Marvel had
supplied Kirby with preexisting themes, the other factual disputes offered by the Kirbys should have been considered by the court before
it broadly concluded Jack Kirby’s works were made at Marvel’s expense. Relying only on Marvel’s payment of Kirby, as the court in
Playboy did, the court dismissed critical factual issues which should
have survived summary judgment.
Although the Kirbys offered viable evidence to the contrary,
the court in Marvel held that Jack Kirby’s works were made at “Marvel’s instance and expense,” and thus, Jack Kirby’s works were
works made for hire during the relevant time period.187 Because Kirby created the works with Marvel themes in mind and Marvel paid
Kirby for the works, it suggested the creation of Kirby’s works was
under Marvel’s control. Therefore, Marvel owned the rights to Jack
Kirby’s works, and the Kirbys did not have termination rights under
the Copyright Act of 1976.

181

Id. at 47-48.
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 51.
185
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 51.
186
Id.
187
Marvel, 726 F.3d at 143. After the instance and expense test is satisfied, a presumption “arises that the works were ‘works made for hire’.” Id. “This presumption can be overcome only by evidence of an agreement to the contrary . . . .” Id. In this case, the court stated the Kirbys failed to establish evidence which would support an agreement to the contrary.
Id.
182
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WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE AND ITS MODERN
IMPLICATIONS

The development of the work for hire doctrine has significantly evolved since its initial creation under the Copyright Act of 1909.
Illustrative works created decades ago are constantly being reborn
though motion picture adaptations, video games, and toys, and the
application of the work for hire doctrine is critical in determining
ownership of these potentially lucrative works. As seen in Marvel,
the modern application of the work for hire doctrine affects all artists
whose work may be turned into a derivative production.
A.

Marvel Attempts to Prove Work for Hire for Ghost
Rider

The Second Circuit decided Gary Friedrich Enterprises, LLC
v. Marvel Characters, Inc.,188 shortly before the decision in Marvel
was rendered.189 The plaintiff, a freelancer for Marvel, appealed
from summary judgment dismissal and argued, inter alia, that he
owned the rights to the character “Ghost Rider.”190 In 1971, the
plaintiff approached a former Marvel publisher with an idea for a
storyline of a motorcycle-riding villain named “Ghost Rider.”191 A
meeting was then set up with the director of Marvel, Stan Lee, who
approved the book idea, but also interjected his own ideas for the
character.192
After the meeting, the plaintiff began writing story lines for
the character.193 However, “[t]he rest of the book was produced according to the ‘Marvel Method,’ ” which was a template Marvel
requried all its artists follow.194 Marvel also retained editorial control
188

716 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 308. The plaintiff in this case appealed the district court’s ruling of summary
judgment for Marvel. Id. at 307-08.
190
Id. at 307.
191
Id. at 321.
192
Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 321.
193
Id.
194
Id. The “Marvel Method” was a way in which to keep Marvel artists busy in order to
produce more comic book plots efficiently and in a timely manner. See Marvel Comics,
CRACKED.COM, http://www.cracked.com/funny-55-marvel-comics/ (last visited May 2, 2014)
(“[T]he Marvel Method meant that the writer came up with a basic plot, the penciler drew
whatever he wanted as long as it corresponded to that plot, and the writer went back over the
penciled pages and filled in captions and dialogue.”).
189
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and paid the plaintiff at a per page rate.195
The court discussed the work for hire agreement that the
plaintiff signed after the 1976 Act came into effect.196 The document
stated that any works which “have been or are in the future created”
belong to Marvel as a work made for hire.197 While it seemed as
though it was an effective work for hire agreement covering the
plaintiff’s past and future works, the Second Circuit held that the
agreement was sufficiently vague to constitute a factual dispute.198
Furthermore, the parties’ intentions embodied in the agreement were
irrelevant because many of the works at issue were created pursuant
to the 1909 Act as opposed to the 1976 Act.199 Therefore, on remand,
Marvel could only offer evidence of the parties’ intention to show an
implied work for hire agreement.200
Although the case was remanded based on factual issues, the
court stated that a jury would most likely find the plaintiff’s work to
be one made for hire.201 The court noted that the plaintiff had “nothing more than an uncopyrightable idea for a motorcycle-riding character when he presented it to Marvel because he had not yet fixed the
idea into a tangible medium.”202 The court stated that Marvel “induced the creation of” the character and “had the right” to supervise
the plaintiff’s work.203 The director of Marvel also commissioned the
costs; thus, the work was made at Marvel’s expense.204 Therefore,
even if the work for hire agreement between the two parties was held
to be unenforceable, the evidence of the relationship between the
plaintiff and Marvel could prove the work for “Ghost Rider” was
made for hire.205
The issues presented in Gary Friedrich were similar to the issues presented in Marvel because it was argued that both artists originated the work. There were more factual issues in Marvel concern195

Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 321.
Id. at 309. If a work does not fall within the scope of employment under 17 U.S.C. §
101(1), then an express work for hire agreement is needed for a work to fall under 17 U.S.C.
§ 101(2). 17 U.S.C. § 101(2).
197
Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 310.
198
Id. at 314-15.
199
Id. at 316.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 321.
202
Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 321.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
196
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ing the instance and expense components, but unlike the outcome of
Gary Friedrich, the controversy in Marvel was not remanded for a
determination of the factual issues.206 Unlike the artist in Gary Friedrich, Kirby was not subjected to the “Marvel Method” according to
creative director, Stan Lee.207 This shows Kirby had more creative
control than other artists; thus, the argument of Marvel’s control over
Kirby may not have been as strong as it was for the artist in Gary
Friedrich. However, in both cases, Marvel maintained some editorial
control of the work with the right to reject and edit the work.208
Overall, in comparing the relationships between Marvel and
the artists, the work by the artist in Gary Friedrich was clearly at the
instance and expense of Marvel. Because the “Ghost Rider” character was a Marvel character prior to the artist’s plotline for the series,
the work was created at Marvel’s instance.209 The court in Gary
Friedrich also found that Marvel paid all costs throughout the production of the book, which weighed strongly in favor of the expense
component.210 Therefore, the Second Circuit applies the instance and
expense component on a case by case basis.
B.

Does the Instance and Expense Test Favor the
Hiring Party?

The Second Circuit’s use of the instance and expense test for
works created under the Copyright Act of 1909 displays a thorough
approach in determining an implied work for hire agreement; however, if too broadly applied, the test may tend to favor the hiring party
as the owner of the works. Although this test has not been applied to
works under the 1976 Act, this argument is applicable when determining scope of employment under the current Act based on the Reid
analysis.
The argument of overbreadth was a focal point for the Kirbys
in their appeal to the Second Circuit, although it did not gain recognition by the court.211 The Kirbys argued, “[i]f ‘instance and expense’
is too broadly or literally construed . . . the ‘test’ ceases to have any
206
207
208
209
210
211

Id.; Marvel, 726 F.3d at 140-41, 143.
Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 321; Marvel, 726 F.3d at 141.
Id.
Gary Friedrich, 716 F.3d at 321.
Id.
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 54-55.
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meaning or to differentiate ‘work for hire’ and non-’work for hire,’ as
it applies equally to both.”212 The Kirbys’ argument was that a broad
application of the test would create unfounded contradictions under
the work for hire doctrine.213 For example, if a traditional employee
creates a work outside the scope of his duties, and the employer still
has the right to supervise it, the work would not be considered a work
made for hire.214 However, if a court were to apply a broad application of the instance and expense test to an independent contractor’s
work, trace evidence of a work being commissioned at the hiring party’s instance, control, and expense may incline the court to find a
work made for hire.215 How is it that a traditional employee could retain ownership of a work just because it was outside the scope of his
duties, but an independent contractor may not have ownership of the
work because the hiring party exercised some control and paid a sum
certain?
The contradictions further demonstrate how a broad application of the instance and expense test defies the common law principles of agency as embodied under both Acts.216 The instance and expense test is intended to prompt the courts to decide whether the
hiring party’s actions displayed evidence of control similar to that of
a traditional employer-employee relationship. In articulating the factors of a traditional employer-employee relationship, courts must adhere to the law of agency. Determining the scope of employment under the law of agency suggests there must be existence of a
“conventional master-servant relationship” in the parties’ situation.217
Trace evidence of work being done at the hiring party’s instance and
expense does not support a master-servant relationship. If the test is
applied too broadly, especially in cases of freelancers and independent contractors, it can be said that any work is a work made for
hire.218
If Marvel was decided under the standard established in Reid,
several issues of fact would have survived summary judgment. Kirby
was a freelancer for Marvel and set his own hours, used his own sup212

Id. at 54.
Id. at 54 n.5.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 54 n.5.
217
Id. at 55 (quoting Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440,
445, 452 (2003)); see also Reid, 490 U.S. at 739-40.
218
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 160, at 55.
213
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plies, and had relatively broad discretion over his work. 219 This creates a notion that Kirby was an independent contractor like the artist
in Reid, rather than a traditional employee.220 However, Marvel
would argue that when applying other elements of common law
agency, Marvel retained some type of editorial control and the parties
maintained an extensive working relationship.221 Although there is
evidence supporting both arguments, Kirby as an independent contractor and Kirby as a traditional employee working within the scope
of employment, it is more likely that Kirby would be considered a
traditional employee. Because of Marvel and Kirby’s ongoing relationship, and Kirby’s consistent dedication to producing work within
Marvel themes, Kirby was continuously acting as an employee within
the scope of his employment at Marvel every time he sketched a new
work.
These arguments point the conclusion that the instance and
expense test cannot be applied too broadly without risking the loss of
its credibility. Although the outcome in Marvel would most likely be
the same if articulated under the Reid standard, the broad application
of the instance and expense test creates a heavier burden for the artist.
The test makes it more likely that hiring parties will prevail as long as
the hiring party gathers some evidence of the hiring party’s control
over the creation of the work. The test needs to be narrowly applied,
and the hiring party must present consistent and compelling evidence
in order to show the relationship resembled a traditional employeremployee relationship.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This note demonstrates the importance of the work for hire
doctrine in determining ownership rights of copyrighted works. Under both the 1909 Act and the current Copyright Act of 1976, the
work for hire doctrine is guided by the law of agency in order to determine whether a person’s work was created on behalf of another.
The instance and expense test further aids the courts in deciding
whether the hiring party owns the work of a non-traditional employee. The application of the work for hire doctrine is crucial because
whoever is deemed the owner of the work is the one who stands to
219
220
221

Marvel, 726 F.3d at 125-26.
Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-53.
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benefit from the work’s earnings. This means an original artist may
have no say in terminating the purportedly assigned rights because he
may not have been the owner of those rights all along. Especially in
today’s world of multi-million dollar derivative works, an artist may
stand to lose those potential earnings due to the application of the
doctrine. In order to ensure an efficient ruling, the work for hire doctrine needs to be applied consistently and supported by compelling
evidence.
Allison E. Dolzani
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